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Abstract 
While the importance of venture capital (VC) can be highlighted by policy goals 
outlined in the ‘Lisbon agenda’, the European VC industry remains nascent in 
comparison to the more sophisticated VC market in the US. Researchers have identified 
key determinants that foster VC success on a broad level, and have often identified 
syndication as an important factor of success. This paper seeks to understand the role of 
syndication on the VC-backed company’s success. I take a novel departure from past 
research in this area in three ways 1) I measure performance from the perspective of the 
portfolio company, rather than the VC firm which invests in the company 2) I isolate 
syndication in the first financing round and 3) I utilize a logistical model as well as a 
simultaneous equation model for which I introduce an instrumental variable. I gather VC 
data for both Europe and the US from the VentureXpert database to test various 
hypotheses regarding syndication. The results are significant and provide evidence to 
support that syndication in the first financing round is associated with greater success in 
achieving IPO exit in both regions. This should encourage VC firms, VC-backed 
companies, and policymakers to increase the practice of VC syndication in early 
financing rounds, thereby providing access to greater long-term growth opportunities. 
This paper adds to the existing, but limited, literature base on cross-region venture capital 
syndication.  
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EFFECTS OF EARLY ROUND VENTURE CAPITAL SYNDICATION ON 
IPO EXITS IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 
Recent economic turmoil has highlighted the growth concerns in Europe, where 
the jobless count has increased to 10.8 per cent1 (FT.com, 2012). While the United States 
(US) and Europe have comparable capital markets, the development of venture capital 
(VC) within the two regions differs significantly. The US has a much more advanced VC 
industry compared to that of Europe’s. However, European advances in the VC industry 
are notable, as the industry makes important contributions to the economy through 
rejuvenating existing industries, supporting high-growth-potential companies, and 
creating employment opportunities. Policy-makers would benefit from increased efforts 
in supporting financial environments that are suitable in fostering VC investment.   
This paper looks at the specific aspect of VC syndication within the first stage of 
financing in European and US VC companies. Specifically, I focus on syndication 
activity and its effects on IPO exit. The literature on VC in Europe is somewhat limited 
due to the lack of sufficient data. The topic of syndication further limits the pool of 
literature which primarily focuses on the testing of theories of motivations for syndication 
and looks at the performance of the VC firm investing within the portfolio company, as 
opposed to the performance of the actual portfolio company. Furthermore, most research 
on syndication looks at overall syndication, without focusing on particular stages of 
financing. Deli & Santhanakrishnan (2010) find that syndication occurs mostly in the 
earliest stages of development and firms in the last stage of development, highlighting the 
importance of looking at particular investment rounds when considering syndication as a 
                                               
1 This figure is for the 17-country bloc within the eurozone as of April 9, 2012. 
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determinant of success. Thus, this research offers substantial novelty in the area of cross-
regional research on venture capital financing. I find significant evidence to support 
syndication in first financing rounds as a contributor to successful exit (specifically, IPO). 
 I begin with a brief history of VC markets in Europe. I then review the literature 
on VC syndication, outlining the motivations behind syndication from the VC firm’s 
perspective and past research on syndication from the perspective of the portfolio 
company. These aid in generating testable hypotheses of VC syndication. My approach 
has two parts. First, I use a logistical (logit) model to explain both the effects of the 
syndication presence on IPO exit and also the effects of magnitude2 of syndication on 
IPO exit. The results are significant and associate European syndication with a 19% 
increase in the probability of IPO, while syndication in US portfolio companies is 
associated with a 40.9% increase in IPO success. Additionally, this approach provides 
evidence that supports the idea of diminishing returns to the addition of investors within 
the first round syndicate in US VC companies. This result is also seen with the European 
sample, but the result is not significant. In the second approach, I seek to mitigate 
endogeneity issues by using a simultaneous equations model (SEM) and introducing an 
instrumental variable (IV). I compare biased ordinary least squares estimates (OLS) with 
IV estimates derived from a two-stage least-squares (2SLS) computational method. 
Under this approach, I find that the effect of European syndication on IPO increases to 
43.4%. This result is significant for the European sample. However, this approach cannot 
                                               
2 Throughout this paper magnitude refers to the number of investors within a particular financing round. 
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be used for the US sample3. Both methods offer good insight into the topic of syndication 
and add to the existing literature base on venture capital. 
I. History of European Venture Capital 
A. The Rise (and Fall) of Venture Capital and New Stock Markets in Europe 
The US pioneered the unparalleled boom of the VC markets during the 1990s, 
with its dominance in the high tech realm. The booming VC industry was also seen in 
Europe, but not to the same extent. The growth of funds invested in European venture 
capital between 1995 and 2000 was about six-fold (Bottazzi, Da Rin, van Ours, & 
Berglöf, 2002). While this is impressive, this was a mere quarter of the growth 
experienced in the US during the same time period.  Nevertheless, prominent efforts were 
made to establish a pan-European network to promote the listing of growth companies 
during the 1990’s. In 1996, the Easdaq was established in Belgium as a pan-European 
market for growth companies. Similarly, in 1997, the Euro.nm was established as a pan-
European network of regulated markets dedicated to growth companies, which included 
stock exchanges of Amsterdam, Paris and Brussels, along with Deutsche Börse AG and 
Borsa Italiana. Both networks were largely modeled after the American NASDAQ, but 
unlike NASDAQ, these European equivalents would be short-lived efforts due to the dot-
com bubble burst in 2000. Easdaq was purchased by NASDAQ in 2001, and after being 
hampered by its small scale and undiversified nature it was closed in 2003 (Dierick & 
Vesala, 2005). The Euro.nm would also suffer an unfortunate fate. However, its failure 
was caused by different factors—namely, that its aim of creating a cooperative pan-
European market was not upheld by the German and Italian new markets (Guidici & 
                                               
3 In the US sample, the IV is dropped because it is perfectly correlated with the dependent variable for IPO 
exit. Thus, the simultaneous equation cannot be identified, and the IV estimation cannot be used. 
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Roosenboom, 2004). The exchanges of Paris, Amsterdam and Brussels would be merged 
into Euronext, while Deutsche Börse AG would opt for independence, leaving the 
Euro.nm abandoned in 2000. 
B. Lisbon Agenda (2000): An Unmet Goal 
The previously mentioned failures of European “new” stock markets highlighted 
the lack of innovation and competitive prowess within Europe. Europe’s inability to 
compete was underscored by its sclerotic growth during the last two decades of the 20th 
century, for which Europe possessed an average growth rate of just above 2.3% annually 
(Economist, 2003). During this same time, the US managed a 3.3% average growth rate 
(Still sclerotic, after all these years, 2003).With Europe trailing behind, the Lisbon 
Strategy4 in 2000 set forth the goal of transforming Europe into the “most competitive 
and dynamic knowledge-based economy” by 2010 (Europarl.europa.eu, 2000). 
By 2004, it was clear that Europe was not positioned to meet the goals outlined in 
the 2000 initiative. During this time, the European Commission revisited their strategy 
and provided an action plan for tackling entrepreneurship. The plan more explicitly 
outlined a framework for boosting strategic entrepreneurship segregating the strategy into 
five different policies: 1) fuelling entrepreneurial mindsets; (2) encouraging more people 
to become entrepreneurs; (3) gearing entrepreneurs or growth and competitiveness; (4) 
improving flow and finance (5) creating a more SME friendly regulatory and 
administrative framework (Arundale, 2007). Under ‘improving the flow finance”, a direct 
strategy listed suggests the improvement of availability of venture capital, business angel 
finance and investments by private individuals (Arundale, 2007). 
                                               
4 As there is no official title for this set of goals, the initiative is also popularly referred to as the “Lisbon 
Strategy for growth and jobs”, “Lisbon Agenda” or “Lisbon Process”. 
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In line with the Lisbon Agenda goals is a growing need for greater research into 
best practices. In 2005, Directorate-General for Enterprise and Industry, which operates 
under the European Commission, published a best practices report for early-stage 
finance. The European Venture Capital Association (EVCA) publishes an annual 
handbook, which encourages best practices. The 2012 handbook includes verbiage on the 
dynamics of syndication, without going in too great detail. Subsequently, there is a 
somewhat notable literature base on syndication practices in recent years. 
II. Literature Review 
Most research in this area focuses on the motivations of syndication, rather than 
the results of syndication. Additionally, the research that does focus on performance, 
usually measures performance from the point of view of the VC firm rather than the VC-
backed company. My research will diverge from this in that it looks at performance from 
the perspective of the VC-backed company, and also focuses on a specific financing 
round, rather than syndication overall. In this section I outline past research on the 
motivations for syndication and then discuss past empirical studies that focus on VC 
performance. 
A. Motivations for Syndication 
Financial Perspective 
Manigart et al (2002) outline main financial motivations for syndication, which 
stems from the need for risk sharing. While investors themselves, as opposed to the VC 
firm, are able to diversify their risks by participating outside of VC markets, 
diversification is difficult for firms to achieve since there is no listing for early stage 
companies. This makes portfolio diversification subject to the presence of ex-ante 
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asymmetric information issues. Syndication allows firms to diversify some of the risk of 
this uncertainty. Additionally, some VC firms may not have the capability to invest fully 
in an investment round for a particular venture. Syndication allows VC firms exposure to 
ventures that they may otherwise not have the capacity to enter, which increases the 
number of companies that they can invest in. In comparison to the stock market, the VC 
market is less liquid and since stock in the venture cannot be traded on a public exchange, 
syndication enables a space for risk sharing on a deal-by-deal or round-by-round basis, 
further reducing overall portfolio risk for VC firms. 
Resource-sharing 
Past research has indicated that VC syndication in the US is motivated by 
financial reasons as well as the need to share resources, whereas European VC 
syndication is more motivated by the financial perspective (Manigart, et al., 2002). The 
definition of “resource” encompasses a broad universe of attributes and can functionally 
include any strengths or weaknesses that VC firms possess. Manigart et al. (2002) 
identify different resources and organize them into two categories: ex-ante and ex-post 
resources. An example of an ex-ante resource is selection capability. A syndicate of VC 
firms are better-equipped to select “good” investments by greater due diligence or better 
assessment of information. This mitigates some of the adverse selection scenarios 
associated with the lack of information in the VC market. In essence, the involvement of 
an additional VC firm can provide an informed second opinion. Superior management 
capability is an example of ex-post resource sharing. Jääskeläinen, Maula, & Seppä 
(2006) show that there is an amount of companies for each VC manager that produces the 
“optimum portfolio”. The number of IPOs in the manager’s portfolio increases with the 
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amount of companies they manage up until this optimum. After this optimum, they are 
unable to optimally manage the portfolio company. Syndication is a vehicle through 
which the resource of management capability can increase its optimal portfolio size, 
allowing managers to manage more companies without mitigating the success of the 
portfolio company. 
Access to Deal Flow 
Access to deal flow can also be a motivation for VC syndication. Syndication 
expands investment scope across geography and industry, and allows for a “dense 
interfirm network” (Manigart, et al., 2002). Within this network, information is 
disseminated across geographic and industry boundaries. This aids in building the 
reputation of the VC firms within the syndicate, thereby creating a “reciprocal, ongoing, 
informal relationship” (Smith, Smith, & Bliss, 2011, pp. 105-106). This could be pivotal 
for young VC firms who want to gain credibility. Manigart et al. (2002) find consistent 
evidence that reciprocity benefits the originator of a syndicate. This result is significant 
across different European countries, indicating a high degree of institutionalization in the 
European VC industry. 
B. Syndication and Performance 
Hege, Palomino, & Schwienbacher (2008) look at a multitude of factors that 
determine the success of VC companies. They look at survey data from VC-backed 
companies and look to exit decisions and the internal rates of returns calculated from 
reported valuations. They investigate the variable for syndication (percentage of past 
deals that have been syndicated with at least one other venture capitalist) and find that 
more syndication has a negative impact for US venture capitalists, but a positive one for 
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European VCs. This result is questionable, as the dependent variable of exit gives equal 
weight for exits in the form of IPO and trade sale. Additionally, they do not control for 
the endogenous choice to syndicate. When they run the regression once again, placing 
greater weights on IPO exits, the above result is insignificant. However, Hege, Palomino, 
& Schwienbacher (2008) do find significance in the US VC’s tendency to exercise 
greater control rights in their ability to better screen projects.  
The most recent research on syndication and the performance of VC-backed 
companies and syndication is done by Tian (2012). This research isolates two reasons for 
increased value creation via VC syndication: 1) VC syndicates are better in creating 
product market value for the ventures, and 2) VC syndicates offer greater financial 
market value creation. The superiority of VCs in creating product market value for the 
entrepreneurial firm is derived from the resource-sharing based perspective. A VC 
syndicate provides a broader range of inputs for entrepreneurial firms. This results 
support the hypothesis that syndication does create product market value and financial 
market value. My research diverges from Tian’s research in multiple ways. Firstly, it 
expands the sample size and looks at European ventures, as well as American ventures. 
Second, I define syndication differently, since I focus only on syndication within a 
particular financing round. A broad definition of VC syndication is merely that two or 
more VCs fund the entrepreneurial firm5. Tian uses a stricter definition of VC syndication 
and defines it as a situation in which a group of two or more VC firms share in any 
                                               
5 In this definition, a company can have a VC syndicate if every financing round has only one investing VC 
but has a different VC involved in one of the financing rounds. This type of syndication is insufficient for 
my research, as I focus on a specific financing round. 
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particular round of financing6. I will restrict this even further, by focusing on syndication 
in the first investment round. Additionally, I also restrict my definition of a “successful 
exit” as an IPO, since they provide the greatest return on VC investments (Gompers & 
Lerner, 1998). 
Tian provides one of the only instrumental variable (IV) approaches to the 
question of syndication and uses the Industry Concentration Index (ICI) as his IV. The 
ICI measures the concentration of the lead VC firm’s portfolio, by calculating the 
deviation of the VC firm from a hypothetical VC market portfolio. For a particular VC-
backed company, the ICI associated with it would be the weighted average of the ICI’s of 
the VC firms that invested in its first financing round. I use a similar method with a 
different IV in order to mitigate some of the issues with endogeneity. 
III. Theoretical Framework 
A. Benefits of Syndication 
Syndication allows for great benefits to the portfolio company, and not only to the 
VC firm. Schwienbacher (2005) posits that the presence of syndication makes possible 
the existence of positive network externalities, which increases the pool of contacts 
available when looking for a potential buyer, which is important for harvesting. 
Brander, Amit, & Antweiler (2002) describe the selection hypothesis in the 
context of VC syndication. The presence of having more than one venture capitalist 
evaluate a project ex-ante provides the main or lead venture capital with an informed 
second opinion. In exchanging their evaluations of the project, the venture capital firms 
are able to learn more about the investment than they would have otherwise. While it may 
                                               
6 In Tian’s research, a company that has a VC syndicate invest in its second round, but not its first round 
would be identified as “syndicated”. 
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seem that the primary beneficiary of this informed second opinion is the investor, ex-
ante, the actual reduction in uncertainty from the exchange in information between 
syndicate members should aid in better decision making processes in subsequent rounds. 
Brander, Amit, & Antweiler (2002) highlight that this exchange process could occur in 
subsequent rounds and further reduce uncertainty. I argue that my focus on the first round 
is sufficient to capture the significance of syndication since this is where the greatest 
uncertainty lies. Thus, the information exchange that occurs in this round should, in 
theory, be a great source of reduced uncertainty about the company. This forms the 
hypothesis that syndication in the first financing round of venture backed companies will 
positively correlate with exiting through IPO in both US and European venture-backed 
companies. 
B. Indirect Reduction of Principal-Agency Costs 
 In many ways, the relationship between the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur 
represents a principal-agent problem, wherein the venture capitalist is the principal and 
the entrepreneur is the agent. In this type of problem, the presence of asymmetrical 
information and incomplete information creates a moral hazard and a conflict of interest 
that can lead to shirking by the entrepreneur (Filatotchev, Wright, & Arberk, 2006). The 
mitigation of these agency costs is usually done through contracting. However, 
syndication can act as another means by which the VC can safeguard their investment, 
thereby allowing VC firms to take on riskier investments that may have more harvest-
potential, thereby creating better IPO exit opportunities. This should also support the 
hypothesis introduced in the last section. 
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C. Regional Differences in VC Markets 
The growing research on the value creation of syndication supports the idea that 
syndication will have an overall positive impact on IPO syndication in both the US and 
Europe. However, the effect of syndication is bound to be different between the two 
regions. Given the common perception that European venture capitalist are limited in 
their value-adding approach and focus on financial engineering, while American VCs add 
further value through greater monitoring of their portfolio companies, syndication may 
play a more significant role in value creation and subsequently IPO exiting 
(Schwienbacher, 2005). While I estimate that syndication positively affects both regions, 
I conjecture that the effect of syndication on IPO exit will be stronger for the US VC-
backed companies. 
D. Introduction of Principal-Principal Agency Problem 
While VC syndication seemingly benefits everyone, there are counteracting forces 
that mitigate some of the advantages. In particular, the presence of syndication may lead 
to the emergence of a principal-principal agency problem, which is explored by 
Filatotchev, Wright and Arberk (2006). The standard principal-agent problem describes 
the dilemma of incomplete and/or asymmetric information when a principal (the investor) 
hires an agent (the investee or entrepreneur), which gives rise to conflicts of interest or 
moral hazard. Due to information asymmetries, the agent may engage in undue risky 
behavior. Within the syndicate, there are multiple “agents” and thus decision making is 
shared. The principal-principal agency problem arises from “the diverse objectives of 
members and the time-consuming nature of coordination” (Filatotchev, Wright, & 
Arberk, 2006). Such diverse incentives lead to an increase in conflicts of interest and lack 
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of cooperation. This lack of cooperation can manifest itself into time, which has tangible 
impacts on the VC company. 
In most principal-principal situations, the lack of coordination is inherent. Unique 
to this particular situation is the fact that the syndicates are “temporary in nature with the 
financing structure constructed specifically for that transaction” (Filatotchev, Wright, & 
Arberk, 2006). This compounds the principal-principal problem, as it increases the 
avenues for moral hazard. Each principal is not only governed by their individual 
objectives; they may also have greater motivations for pushing their objectives since they 
are not obligated to partake in subsequent rounds. Of course, reputation plays a rather 
large role within the VC firms, and may act as a backstop to heightened moral hazards. 
Furthermore, staging gives rise to more principal-principal problems, as a lead 
VC that was present in earlier rounds may have an informational advantage over other 
VCs in the syndicate that choose to enter in later rounds (Filatotchev, Wright, & Arberk, 
2006). Since this paper focuses on the first round, the previous effects are paramount, 
with the reasonable assumption that the informational asymmetries between the different 
principals due to staging are reduced. However, overall informational asymmetries 
between principals within the first stage should still be reflected in the results. Thus, the 
final hypothesis is: the number of investors in the first financing round of venture backed 
companies will positively correlate with IPO exits in both US and European venture-
backed companies, but with diminishing returns 
IV. Methodology and Empirical Results 
In this section I describe the dataset and methodology that aid my exploration of 
key hypotheses. First, I use a logistical regression approach in order to study the effects 
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of both syndication presence and syndication magnitude with different cuts of the dataset 
(All, US, and Europe). I then use a simultaneous equations model via two different 
estimation methods—ordinary least square (OLS) and two stage least squares (2SLS). 
For the US sample size, the instrumental variable is perfectly correlated with the 
endogenous variable. Therefore, the 2SLS estimation method cannot be used for this 
sample. I display results for both regressions to provide a more complete interpretation of 
the research question. 
A. Dataset 
 The data used is constructed from the VentureXpert database provided through 
Thomson Financial. The data is updated as of December 3, 2009. The companies 
included in the regressions are those that have their first investment rounds between 1985 
and 2005. The search is limited to the venture capital sample7 (this screen thereby 
excludes private equity deals and those that are labeled as unknown). For the European 
sample, the countries are limited to the 27 countries within the EU and the four countries 
within the EFTA, as these comprise the European Economic Area8. The country variable 
depends on the location of the venture-backed company, and not on the location of the 
VC firm that is investing in the particular venture. This process yields a sample of 13,207 
VC-backed companies within the European sample. The United Kingdom has the largest 
number of ventures with 3,904 companies; France is next with 2,453 companies, and 
Germany follows with 1,607 companies. For the United States, there are 25,370 
observations. 
                                               
7 Thomson Reuters uses the term to describe the universe of venture investing. It does not include buyout 
investing, mezzanine investing, fund of fund investing, secondaries, etc. 
8 For a list of countries see Table 1 
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 I created the variable of IPO_DUMMY, which is a binary variable equaling 1 if 
the venture-backed company’s “Situation” is defined as “Went Public” in the 
VentureXpert database, and 0 otherwise. Some of the options under this variable include: 
“LBO”, “Merger”, “Acquisition”, “Chapter 11”, “Chapter 7”, and “Defunct”. A list of 
variables collected is described in Table 1. 
B. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 and Table 3 summarize the characteristics of the average venture capital 
firm in each European country, Europe as a whole, and the US. European venture backed 
companies overall have a smaller average number of investors within the first financing 
round as well as smaller number of financing rounds overall. The average number of 
investors in the first round is 1.51 for Europe and 2.11 for the US. The average number of 
financing stages in Europe is 1.7 versus 2.66 for the US, indicating that the US has a 
greater emphasis on stage financing. Syndication in the first investment round is much 
more popular in the US, with 56% of venture-backed companies syndicating in the first 
investment round, versus only 31% of the entire European sample. The method of IPO 
and acquisition are more popular exit options for the US, with 9% of companies having 
gone public, and 21% having been acquired. While the US seems to experience more 
upsides in exiting, it also experiences more downside with 11% of VC-backed companies 
categorized as “defunct” versus only 1% in Europe. However, only 6% of European 
companies experience successful exit, and only 7% of European companies are acquired.   
Table 6 and 7 show information about the sector breakdown of the venture backed 
companies in the sample. The US sample is more evenly distributed across the six 
industries, with about 33% of the companies falling into Biotechnology and another 3% 
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falling into the Communications and Media industry. About a majority of the European 
venture-backed companies are within the Biotechnology industry (50.6%). 
Communications and Media is the second most popular sector, accounting for about a 
quarter of the venture backed companies. About 9% of European ventures are devoted to 
life sciences, while about 14% of US ventures in the sample lie within this sector. 
Conditional on the sector and location, the European nations generally have a smaller 
percentage of IPO exits9. For instance, within the biotechnology venture capital 
companies in the EU, only 4.81% of the largest sector in the European sample 
(biotechnology) went public. The European computer related sector has the largest 
percentage of IPOs given sector and region, with 9.54% experiencing IPO. In the US, 
non-high technology companies have the largest percentage of IPOs given sector and 
region with 17.58% experiencing IPOs. The Computer related sector trails behind Non-
High Tech, with 12.59% of these firms experiencing IPO. 
Table 7 shows other summary statistics for additional variables that are included 
in regression models. The variable INVESTORS_ROUND1 are the number of investors 
in round 1. The SYNDICATE_SIZE_ROUND_1 variable also represents the number of 
investors in round 1, but only for those firms that have a 1 for the SYND_RND1 variable, 
which is an indicator variable for syndication in the first round. NUM_ROUNDS is the 
overall number of staged financing rounds for a given venture capital company. Although 
this paper focuses on syndication within the first financing stage, overall staging is an 
important variable to examine. The general effect of staging increases the expected value 
                                               
9 This percentage is calculated by taking the number of companies that have IPO’d within X region and Y 
sector and dividing it by the number of VC companies in X region and Y sector. 
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of the venture, since it acts as an incentive for the entrepreneur to work harder in early 
stages (Schwienbacher, 2005). 
The mean number of investors for the first investment round in US venture 
backed companies is 2.11 versus the European venture backed companies at 1.51 
investors. The last column provides the p-value for a two-group mean comparison test 
that compares the differences between the means of the two regions for all four variables. 
For all the listed variables, the differences in the means between the two regions are 
significant in the 1% level. The median number of investors is also reported, as it 
provides meaningful insight into whether or not the median portfolio company has first 
round syndication or not. The median INVESTORS_ROUND1 in the US is 2, which 
forms a syndicate. The median INVESTORS_ROUND1 in Europe is 1, which does not 
form a syndicate. The US also has a higher average number of staged investment rounds 
at 2.67, whereas the mean number of rounds in Europe is 1.69. These figures support 
Hypothesis 1a and 1b. The DISCLOSED_ROUND_TOTAL_TH is significantly higher 
in Europe at $16.62 million vs. the US’s $12.78 million. This makes intuitive sense given 
the smaller number of financing rounds in Europe. This means that the concentration of 
investment will be higher within a given round. 
C. Standard Logistical Approach 
The main regression tool used for further analysis of the dataset is the logistical 
regression (logit) model as is ensures that the estimated response probabilities are strictly 
between zero and one, and also makes calculation of the odds ratio easier.  
I define: 
݌ = ݌ݎ݋ܾ	(ܫܱܲ_ܦܷܯܯܻ = 1)               (1) 
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Equation 1 is incorporated into the following logit model: 
ܮ݋݃݅ݐ(݌) = log൬ ݌1 − ݌൰ =	 ߙ + ߚଵܻܵܰܦ_ܴܰܦ1 + ߚଶܷܰܯ_ܴܱܷܰܦܵ	 + 
ߚଷܷܰܯ_ܴܱܷܰܦܵ_ܴܵܳ + 		ߚேܫܰܦܷܴܻܵܶ_ܦܷܯܯܻ_ܻ	 + 	ߚோܻܧܣܴ_ܦܷܯܯ ோܻ 	+ ߝ௝ (2) 
Table 9 shows the results of the logit regression, where IPO_DUMMY is the 
dependent binary variable that indicates whether the venture-backed company went 
public; the variable is 1 if the company has gone public and 0 if it has not. SYND_RND1 
is the independent binary outcome variable that indicates whether or not the venture 
backed company has syndicated its first financing investment round; the variable is 1 if 
the company has more than 1 investor in its first financing stage and 0 if there is only one 
investor in its first financing stage. NUM_ROUNDS is the number of rounds of financing 
that the venture backed company has had to date. A squared term for NUM_ROUNDS is 
also included to control for the effects of adding an additional financing round. I also 
control for year and industry with dummy variables for the six industry categorizations 
and each of the twenty years (respectively). 
I estimate equation 2 for the European sample and the US sample separately.  The 
results indicate that the SYND_RND1 is significant at the 5% level for Europe and at the 
1% level for the US. The coefficients can be interpreted using the odds ratio. Taking the 
coefficient of β1=0.176  implies that, fixing for other factors, syndicating the first round is 
associated with making IPO exit 1.19 times more probable (or a 19% increase in 
probability). For the US, this figure is much larger at 40.9%. This result is much higher 
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than what I expected from Tian’s results that found that syndicate-backed10 firms are only 
“12% more likely to exit through IPO instead of write-off relative to an individual backed 
firm” 11 (Tian, 2012, p. 10). 
The NUM_ROUNDS is significant for both samples at the 1% level. The β2 
coefficient for Europe implies that a unit increase in the number of financing stages is 
associated with making the IPO event more likely to occur by 16.0%.  
I use a similar set of equation to test the significance of the syndication magnitude 
(the number of investors in the first financing stage): 
݌ = ݌ݎ݋ܾ	(ܫܱܲ_ܦܷܯܯܻ = 1)              (3) 
And, 
ܮ݋݃݅ݐ(݌) =
	log ቀ ௣
ଵି௣
ቁ =	 ߙ + ߚଵܫܸܰܧܱܴܵܶܵ_ܴܱܷܰܦ1 + 	ߚଶܫܸܰܧܱܴܵܶܵ_ܴܱܷܰܦ1_ܴܵܳ +
ߚଷܷܰܯ_ܴܱܷܰܦܵ + ߚସܷܰܯ_ܴܱܷܰܦܵ_ܴܵܳ + 		ߚேܫܰܦܷܴܻܵܶ_ܦܷܯܯ ௒ܻ 		+
ߚோܻܧܣܴ_ܦܷܯܯ ோܻ 	+ ߝ௝                     (4) 
In this regression we care about the number of investors that comprises the 
syndicated or individually-backed first financing round. Table 9 shows the results of the 
logit regression. Let IPO_DUMMY be the binary outcome variable that indicates whether 
the venture backed company; the variable is 1 if the company has gone public and 0 if it 
has not. INVESTORS_ROUND1is the number of investors in the first financing rounds. 
NUM_ROUNDS is the number of rounds of financing that the venture backed company 
                                               
10 Note that Tian does not isolate syndication in the first stage of financing and considers syndication over 
all financing rounds. 
11 Note that my result is relative to other forms of exit and not just “write-off”. Also note that Tian’s results 
only apply to the US sample. 
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has had to date. Squared terms for both INVESTORS_ROUND1and NUM_ROUNDS 
are also included. There are industry and year dummies as well. 
The regression is separately estimated for the European sample and the US. For 
the US sample, INVESTORS_ROUND1, INVESTORS_ROUND1_SQR, 
NUM_ROUNDS, NUM_ROUNDS_SQR were all significant at the 1% level.  The 
coefficient for INVESTORS_ROUND1for the European sample is positive and 
significant at the 5% level, meaning that an increase in the number of investors in the first 
financing round in European companies is positively correlated with going public. The 
odds ratio is exp(0.169)= 1.184, implying that, fixing for other variables, a one unit 
change in the INVESTORS_ROUND1 by 1 is associated with an increased probability of 
IPO exit by 18.4%. For the US, this figure is 21.2%. Each one unit increase in 
NUM_ROUNDS in European VC-backed companies makes IPO exit more likely by 
14.9%. For the US, this figure is only 13.2%. For both the US and Europe, 
INVESTORS_ROUND1_SQR and NUM_ROUNDS_SQR are negative. This means that 
there is a diminishing return to the increase in the number of investors in the first 
financing round, as well as a diminishing return to the increase in the number of rounds. 
If Equation (4) is differentiated with respect to INVESTORS_ROUND1, an optimal level 
of investors can be found that optimizes the logit equation. To determine this, the 
following condition must be met: 
డ
డே௎ெ_ூே௏ாௌ்ைோௌ ܮ݋݃݅ݐ(݌) = ߚଵ + 	2	ߚଶ ∙ ܫܸܰܧܱܴܵܶܵ_ܴܱܷܰܦ1 = 0	          (7) 
For the US, this implies an optimal number of investors in the first financing round of 
10.62, and 13 for Europe. However, this figure is not significant for Europe.  For the US, 
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this means that having more investors in the first financing round increases the likelihood 
of going public, but after ~11 investors, the likelihood of going public starts to decrease. 
The result is inconclusive for the European sample as the p-value is too high. This 
inconclusive result for Europe could simply be related to the smaller size of the European 
sample.  
The same can be done for the number of financing rounds: 
డ
డே௎ெ_ோை௎ே஽ௌ ܮ݋݃݅ݐ(݌) = ߚଵ + 	2	ߚଶ ∙ ܷܰܯ_ܴܱܷܰܦܵ = 0	           (8) 
This implies an optimal number of rounds of ~6 rounds in the US, and ~13 in Europe. It 
should be noted that NUM_ROUNDS_SQR is not significant for the European sample 
and thus the optimal number of financing stages cannot be fully supported.  
D. Simultaneous Equations Model (SEM) with OLS and 2SLS Estimates 
 Endogeneity is an important issue in econometric models. An important and 
sometimes overlooked form of endogeneity is simultaneity, which arises when “one or 
more of the explanatory variables is jointly determined with the dependent variable” 
(Woolridge, 2009, p. 546). Simultaneity can occur between IPO exiting and syndication 
in the first round. Although the two may not be decided simultaneously in a literal sense, 
there is a sense of dependency in the determination of the two. Multiple VC firms may be 
attracted to the IPO-worthiness of the particular venture, and thus syndication may occur. 
In a way, the decision to syndicate may go hand in hand with a preemptive decision to 
produce this particular exit. 
 The IV approach can often serve as a solution to the aforementioned issues. Using 
ordinary-least square (OLS) to estimate a model requires that each explanatory variable is 
uncorrelated with the error term. Using a SEM simplifies the IV approach, as it does not 
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necessarily require this fundamental condition (Woolridge, 2009). The variable 
CO_FIRM_NATION_SAME is introduced as the instrumental variable. This variable is 
1 if the nation in which the VC-backed company is based in the same country as an 
associated “lead” investor firm within the first financing round, and 0 otherwise. The lead 
investor within the financing round is determined as the investor who contributes the 
largest investment amount within a particular financing round (i.e. the “lead” could be 
different in subsequent rounds, but this is immaterial since I do not look at subsequent 
financing rounds). If there is a tie12, the lead investor is assigned to the investor which is 
based within the same country as the VC-backed company. Any ties between multiple 
investors from the same country as the company are immaterial since I only want to 
know if there exists a “lead” investor within proximity of the company13. In order to use 
the instrumental variable CO_FIRM_NATION_SAME and achieve a 2SLS estimation, 
the following must be met: 
i. Rank Condition: the first equation in a two-equation simultaneous equations 
model is identified if, and only if, the second equation contains at least one 
exogenous variable (with a nonzero coefficient) that is excluded from the first 
equation 
This condition is clearly met as there is only one endogenous variable, SYND_RND1, 
and there is at least one excluded exogenous variable, CO_FIRM_NATION_SAME, 
from the structural equation (11), which is explained below. The rank condition is 
                                               
12 A “tie” refers to a situation in which two or more firms invest the same amount into the portfolio 
company 
13 For instance, if Company A is in country X, and VC firms B and C are also from country X and have 
both invested the equal amounts within the same financing round, it does not matter if B or C is assigned as 
the “lead” since both are within X. 
  22 
violated for the US sample since there is perfect correlation between the 
CO_FIRM_NATION_SAME variable and the endogenous variable, SYND_RND1, thus 
the IV estimation is not used for the US sample. 
ii. The IV is correlated with the endogenous variable conditional on the other 
covariates. 
The instrumental variable CO_FIRM_NATION_SAME is correlated with the 
endogenous variable SYND_RND1. Table 10 shows an OLS regression with the 
syndication dummy as the dependent variable. The coefficient for 
CO_FIRM_NATION_SAME is negative and significant at the 1% level. Sorenson & 
Stuart (2001) find that “VC firms with a history of provincial investment patterns and 
those without central positions in the industry’s coinvestment network tend to invest 
locally; those who have established many and dispersed relationships with other VC 
firms invest across geographic and industrial spaces more frequently” (Sorenson & 
Stuart, 2001, p. 1584). In light of this, it may be the case that lead investors that are 
within geographical range of their portfolio companies do not have a great incentive to 
syndicate their deals. However, lead investors who are not within a certain geographic 
range of a particular portfolio company may find that they need to syndicate their deals. 
This is an extension of the “access to deal flow” motivation for syndication mentioned 
earlier. IV weakness tests are also performed to support this assumption. Results from 
these tests are reported in Table 11, and explored in greater detail for the latter part of this 
section. 
iii. The IV is not correlated with the error term in the structural equation (i.e. the 
IV does not suffer from the same problem as the endogenous variable). 
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Of the IV criteria, this is usually the most contentious assumption, as there almost always 
exists a rationale against any offered justifications. Intuitively, it is fair to assume that 
CO_FIRM_NATION_SAME would not suffer from the same problem as SYND_RND1. 
The lead investor’s proximity to the portfolio company in the first round should only 
affect the IPO probability through the syndication dummy, if we assume that lead 
investors would syndicate their deal if they were not close to the portfolio company, and 
thus lead to higher chances of IPO. If they do not do so, the success of the portfolio 
company would be jeopardized. One could argue that CO_FIRM_NATION_SAME may 
correlate to the error term as it may affect the unobserved variable of monitoring ability. I 
argue that any monitoring affects attributed to the firm’s proximity to the company is 
explained by their decision to syndicate the deal. 
The following structural equation is used: 
ܫܱܲ_ܦܷܯܯܻ = ߚଵ଴ + ߚଵଵܻܵܰܦ_ܴܰܦ1	 + ߚଵଶܫܸܰܧܱܴܵܶܵ_ܴܱܷܰܦ1_ܴܵܳ		 +
ߚଵଷܷܰܯ_ܴܱܷܰܦܵ	 + ߚଵସܷܰܯ_ܴܱܷܰܦܵ_ܴܵܳ		 + ߚଵହܱܶܶܣܮ_ܫܸܰܧܵܶܯܧܰܶ_ܤ +
ߚଵ଺ܦܫܵܥܮܱܵܧܦ_ܴܱܷܰܦ_ܱܶܶܣܮ_ܯ + 		ߚଵேܫܰܦܷܴܻܵܶ_ܦܷܯܯ ௒ܻ 		+
	ߚଵோܻܧܣܴ_ܦܷܯܯ ோܻ 	+ ݑଵ              (11) 
The following equation is needed for the first-stage regression: 
ܻܵܰܦ_ܴܰܦ1 = ߚଶ଴ + ߚଶଵܫܱܲ_ܦܷܯܯܻ + ߚଶଶܦܫܵܥܮܱܵܧܦ_ܴܱܷܰܦ_ܱܶܶܣܮ_ܯ	 +
ߚଶଷ ∙ ܥܱ_ܨܫܴܯ_ܰܣܶܫܱܰ_ܵܣܯܧ	 + ߚଶே ∙ ܫܰܦܷܴܻܵܶ_ܦܷܯܯ ௒ܻ 		+ 	ߚଶோ ∙
ܻܧܣܴ_ܦܷܯܯ ோܻ 	+ ݑଶ             (12) 
Equations 11 and 12 contain different exogenous variables, as exclusions restrictions 
were imposed on the model. This is generally done in order to distinguish between the 
two structural equations (Woolridge, 2009). This exclusions restriction is necessary so 
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that necessary assumptions can be made. In particular, this model assumes that once 
industry, stage rounds, years, and syndication are controlled for, then the amount invested 
in the first round has no effect on eventual IPO exit. The year dummy variables are 
exogenous, since the passage of time is exogenous, and thus these dummies act as their 
own instruments (Woolridge, 2009). 
Table 11 shows the results from both OLS and the 2SLS estimates. The 
comparison between the OLS and the 2SLS results are astonishing. For the OLS results, 
SYND_RND1 is not significant at any of the specified levels. The coefficient is also very 
small and implies only a 2.1% increase in IPO probability with presence of syndication. 
With the 2SLS estimations, SYND_RND1 becomes significant at the 1% level and the 
coefficient implies a 43.4% increase in the probability of IPO exit. This drastic change 
reveals the inherent bias in the OLS and logit results. Stage financing also becomes more 
significant when the instrumental variable is involved. The coefficient for 
NUM_ROUNDS and NUM_ROUNDS_SQ become significant at the 1% and 5% level 
(respectively) in the 2SLS estimations. Furthermore, the 2SLS results report negative 
coefficient for NUM_ROUNDS, as opposed to the positive coefficient in the OLS results. 
Too much staging may decrease the likelihood of IPO since it may indicate that the VC-
backed company is spending more time in a pre-harvest state. However, the positive and 
significant coefficient estimated for NUM_ROUNDS_SQR indicates that there is an 
increasing return to the number of financing rounds. Following a similar rationale in the 
logistical regression model14, there is a least optimal number of financing rounds that 
                                               
14 In the earlier example, the INVESTORS_ROUND1 coefficient was positive and the 
INVESTORS_ROUND1_SQR coefficient was negative, implying that there is an optimal number of that 
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minimizes IPO probability. Additionally, the 2SLS estimates for the total investment 
amounts TOTAL_INVESTMENT_B and the disclosed investment in the first financing 
stage, DISCLOSED_ROUND_TOTAL_M are no longer significant at even the 10% level.  
 The weak instrument test outlined by Stock & Yogo (2005) will be used to test 
the viability of the 2SLS estimation. The general decision rule they provide is as follows: 
if the Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic is less than the critical value, conclude that the 
instruments are weak, otherwise conclude they are strong. (Stock & Yogo, 2005). For the 
entire sample, the Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic is 52.141. The 1% level Stock-Yogo 
critical value is16.38, which is less than the Cragg-Donald Wald value. Under the Stock-
Yogo rule, the instrument is very strong for the whole sample. However, the Cragg-
Donald Wald F-statistic is only 9.747 for the European subset, which implies a weak 
instrumental variable at the 1% level. However, the instrumental variable is still strong at 
the 15% level, where the Stock-Yogo critical value is 8.96, providing support of the IV 
used. 
V. Conclusions 
A. Results 
Overall, the empirical tests generally support my hypotheses. Overall, the practice 
of syndication is significant in increasing the likelihood of IPO exits for both European 
and US venture backed companies. Under the logit model, I find that VC-backed 
companies in Europe that with syndicated first rounds are 19.1% more likely to IPO 
relative to other forms of exit. In the US, this figure is 40.8%. The results are generally 
                                                                                                                                            
yields the maximum probability of IPO. Conversely, in this example the degree one variable 
(NUM_ROUNDS) is negative and the degree two variable (NUM_ROUNDS_SQR) is positive, thereby 
providing a worst-case number of rounds that yields the least optimal IPO scenario.  
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more significant for the US companies. For the US sample, the diminishing returns of 
syndicate size are also significant, whilst this result is inconclusive for the European 
sample. The inclusion of an instrumental variable also yields significant results for the 
European sample. This approach implies that syndication in first financing rounds is 
associated with a 43.4% increase in IPO exit probability for European countries. This 
figure is much more in line with the US result in the logit equation. This cannot be 
directly compared to an IV result for the US sample size, as this approach cannot be used 
for this particular US sample size. 
B. Implications 
The results should provide researchers, practitioners and policy makers insight 
into the environments that best foster successful entrepreneurial ventures. For 
researchers, the significance of the results is meaningful, and where there are 
inconclusive results, there are avenues for future research. The results suggest that policy 
makers should facilitate public offerings by encouraging syndication via networks, 
especially for first round financings. The listed measures in the Lisbon Agenda for 
fostering venture capital investments mostly centers on guarantees and securitization. 
Policy measures should include discourse on syndication and possible avenues for 
fostering networks that endorse cooperation between investors. Practitioners, both 
investors and entrepreneurs should consider syndication when establishing best practices, 
and should be particularly cognizant of syndication presence along with size. For 
researchers, this paper also provides insight on the novel addition of the IV of 
CO_FIRM_NATION_SAME. 
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C. Avenues for Future Research 
There is an abundance of future areas for research within this topic. Further 
investigation could be done on the diminishing effects of the syndication size for the 
European sample. This was very significant for the US sample, and it would make 
intuitive sense that there is an “optimal” syndicate size for European ventures. Significant 
results could better refine the optimal syndicate size in Europe. Additionally, more 
research into different IVs can lead to better, unbiased results. 
This research was limited to the one method of exit, as IPOs are considered to be 
the more “successful” of the exit methods. Since IPOs tend to foster greater job creation, 
the focus on this successful exit method is relevant. However, further investigation can be 
done on the other methods (LBOs, Acquisition, Merger) listed on Table 3, which may 
also foster growth. Looking primarily at IPO and other “successful” methods can give 
greater insight on the upside potential of syndication in early financing stages. 
Additionally, performing similar regressions with a dependent variable for failure 
(“Defunct” in Table 3) can show if early financing round syndication provides any 
downside protection for venture capital firms. 
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Tables 
Table 1 
List of Variables 
This table explains the numerous variables used throughout the paper. 
 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION 
CO_EUROPE Indicator variable for the company location; 1 if in 
the EU or EFTA  
CO_FIRM_NATION_SAME 1 if the nation in which the venture-backed company 
and associated “lead15” investor firm within the first 
financing round is based in the same country, 0 
otherwise 
CO_INDUSTRY_MAJOR_BIOT Indicator variable for the Biotechnology industry 
CO_INDUSTRY_MAJOR_COM
MS 
Indicator variable for the Media and 
Communications industry 
CO_INDUSTRY_MAJOR_COM
P 
Indicator variable for the Computer Related industry 
CO_INDUSTRY_MAJOR_LIFE
SCI 
Indicator variable for the Medical/Health/Life 
Science industry 
CO_INDUSTRY_MAJOR_SEMI
CON 
Indicator variable for the Semiconductor/Other 
Electronic industry 
DISCLOSED_ROUND_TOTAL
_B 
The disclosed investment amount for the first 
financing round, in billions of dollars 
DISCLOSED_ROUND_TOTAL
_M 
The disclosed investment amount for the first 
financing round, in millions of dollars 
DISCLOSED_ROUND_TOTAL
_TH 
The disclosed investment amount for the first 
financing round, in thousands of dollars 
 
                                               
15 The “lead” is the investor who contributes the largest investment amount within a particular financing 
round (i.e. the “lead” could be different in subsequent rounds, but this is immaterial since I do not look at 
subsequent financing rounds). If there is a tie, the lead investor is assigned to the investor which is based 
within the same country as the venture-backed company. Any ties between multiple investors from the 
same country as the company are immaterial since I only want to know if there exists a “lead” investor 
within proximity of the company. 
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Table 1 
List of Variables (continued) 
 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION 
 
INVESTORS_ROUND1 Number of investors in the first round of financing 
INVESTORS_ROUND1_SQR The square of INVESTORS_ROUND1 
IPO_DUMMY Indicator variable if the company has gone public, 0 
if the company has not gone public 
NUM_ROUNDS Number of financing rounds the company has had to 
date 
NUM_ROUNDS_SQR The square of NUM_ROUNDS 
SYND_RND1 Indicator variable- 1 if the company has more than 
one investors in its first financing round, 0 otherwise 
SYNDICATE_SIZE_ROUND_1 The number of investors in the first financing round, 
if the company syndicated its first financing round 
TOTAL_INVESTMENT_B This is the amount invested within the company to 
date, measured in billions of dollars 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics for Each Nation 
This table shows descriptive statistics segregated by each country in the sample. This shows the 
number of observations, the average number of investors in the first financing rounds, the 
averaged disclosed investment in the first round (note that this is not based on the entire sample 
as some firms do not disclose their investment amounts), and the amount of companies that 
syndicated their first financing round . This data is available on Thomson One’s VentureXpert 
database. 
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Austria 196 1.41 1.46 12,067.32 51 26% 
Belgium 339 1.55 1.60 13,177.10 104 31% 
Bulgaria 21 1.43 1.24 39,200.67 2 10% 
Cyprus 9 1.22 1.22 14,708.56 2 22% 
Czech Republic 71 1.38 1.66 5,186.72 20 28% 
Denmark 353 1.35 1.96 11,408.62 78 22% 
Estonia 14 1.07 1.14 6,317.70 1 7% 
Finland 567 1.39 1.80 8,777.98 137 24% 
France 2,453 1.67 1.73 17,735.29 921 38% 
Germany 1,607 1.49 1.56 15,540.02 465 29% 
Greece 38 1.18 1.08 10,847.92 5 13% 
Hungary 88 1.20 1.56 4,238.15 16 18% 
Ireland 269 1.68 2.00 10,317.88 107 40% 
Italy 455 1.40 1.35 20,140.77 119 26% 
Latvia 19 1.00 1.47 507.71  0% 
Lithuania 13 1.38 1.15 15,389.25 4 31% 
Luxembourg 36 1.56 1.67 93,608.30 14 39% 
Malta 1 1.00 1.00 .  0% 
Netherlands 592 1.45 1.80 31,692.11 167 28% 
Poland 176 1.39 2.13 6,904.66 47 27% 
Portugal 152 1.14 1.43 4,356.72 18 12% 
Romania 48 1.31 1.46 9,074.71 10 21% 
Slovakia 21 1.29 1.62 3,996.54 4 19% 
Slovenia 5 1.00 1.00 .  0% 
Spain 587 1.41 1.30 12,147.37 146 25% 
Sweden 668 1.45 1.96 12,693.38 174 26% 
UK 3,904 1.54 1.74 18,913.19 1,304 33% 
EF
TA
 Iceland 21 1.29 1.48 3,196.89 2 10% 
Liechtenstein  - - - - - - 
Norway 222 1.36 1.61 13,019.79 47 21% 
Switzerland 262 1.64 1.97 16,855.37 91 35%  
Europe 13,207 1.51 1.70 16,623.06 4,056 31% 
 
US 25,370 2.11 2.66 12,380.73 13,724 54% 
 
All 51,784 1.85 2.20 13,662.18 17,780 34% 
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Table 3 
Number and Percent of Popular Exit Options 
This table shows the number of venture backed companies within each country that have gone 
through the different popular exit options. Exit options not included in this summary are: “Active 
Investment”, “Bankruptcy – Chapter 11”, “Bankruptcy – Chapter 7”, “In Registration”, “Other”, 
“Pending Acquisition”, and “Unknown.” This data is available on Thomson One’s VentureXpert 
database. 
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Austria 10 5% 7 4% 0 0% 10 5% 0 0% 
Belgium 21 6% 15 4% 3 1% 38 11% 5 1% 
Bulgaria 1 5% 1 5% 2 10% 2 10% 0 0% 
Cyprus 1 11% 2 22% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 
Czech R. 6 8% 7 10% 1 1% 8 11% 1 1% 
Denmark 9 3% 19 5% 2 1% 28 8% 2 1% 
Estonia 2 14% 1 7% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 
Finland 14 2% 33 6% 11 2% 38 7% 0 0% 
France 143 6% 87 4% 13 1% 353 14% 9 0% 
Germany 85 5% 81 5% 19 1% 149 9% 13 1% 
Greece 6 16% 0 0% 0 0% 3 8% 0 0% 
Hungary 4 5% 5 6% 1 1% 6 7% 0 0% 
Ireland 8 3% 19 7% 5 2% 7 3% 6 2% 
Italy 32 7% 19 4% 5 1% 89 20% 1 0% 
Latvia 0 0% 1 5% 0 0% 1 5% 0 0% 
Lithuania 0 0% 1 8% 0 0% 3 23% 0 0% 
Luxembourg 5 14% 2 6% 0 0% 5 14% 0 0% 
Malta 0 0% 1 100% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 
Netherlands 29 5% 33 6% 5 1% 96 16% 3 1% 
Poland 26 15% 11 6% 3 2% 13 7% 0 0% 
Portugal 6 4% 2 1% 0 0% 7 5% 0 0% 
Romania 3 6% 6 13% 0 0% 8 17% 0 0% 
Slovakia 0 0% 4 19% 0 0% 1 5% 0 0% 
Slovenia 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 1 20% 0 0% 
Spain 13 2% 15 3% 0 0% 76 13% 1 0% 
Sweden 30 4% 68 10% 3 0% 63 9% 6 1% 
UK 266 7% 486 12% 50 1% 854 22% 40 1% 
EF
TA
 Iceland 1 5% 0 0% 0 0% 1 5% 0 0% 
Liechtenst. - - - - - - - - - - 
Norway 20 9% 9 4% 2 1% 21 9% 0 0% 
Switzerland 24 9% 24 9% 2 1% 25 10% 2 1%  
Europe 765 6% 959 7% 127 1% 1906 14% 89 1% 
 
US 2315 9% 5419 21% 355 1% 694 3% 2712 11% 
 
All 3080 6% 6378 12% 482 1% 2600 5% 2801 5% 
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Table 4 
Descriptive Statistics 
This table reports the mean, median, minimum, maximum, standard deviation, variance, and skewness of multiple variables. The 
variables include: INVESTORS_ROUND1, which represents the number of investors within the first financing round; 
SYNDICATE_SIZE_ROUND_1, which represents the number of investors within the first financing round for those observation 
that do syndicate; NUM_ROUNDS, which represents the number of financing rounds for the VC-backed company; and 
DISCLOSED_ROUND_TOTAL_TH, which represents the total amount invested within the first financing stage. Individual 
statistics are reported for each region (US versus Europe). 
 
United States               
Variable mean median min max sd variance skewness 
INVESTORS_ROUND1 2.1121 2 1 21 1.53 2.35 2.40 
SYNDICATE_SIZE_ROUND_1 3.0558 2 2 21 1.55 2.41 2.55 
NUM_ROUNDS 2.6624 2 1 23 2.31 5.33 2.13 
DISCLOSED_ROUND_TOTAL_TH 12785 3000 1 4E+06 72200 6E+09 25.61 
                
                
Europe               
Variable mean median min max sd variance skewness 
INVESTORS_ROUND1 1.5115 1 1 15 1.01 1.01 3.22 
SYNDICATE_SIZE_ROUND_1 2.6654 2 2 15 1.17 1.37 2.93 
NUM_ROUNDS 1.6989 1 1 18 1.38 1.90 3.10 
DISCLOSED_ROUND_TOTAL_TH 16623 3137 1 2E+06 69855 5E+09 15.36 
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Table 5 
Descriptive Statistics with Difference T-test 
This table reports the mean and median statistics for the following variables: INVESTORS_ROUND1, which represents the 
number of investors within the first financing round; SYNDICATE_SIZE_ROUND_1, which represents the number of investors 
within the first financing round for those observation that do syndicate; NUM_ROUNDS, which represents the number of 
financing rounds for the VC-backed company; and DISCLOSED_ROUND_TOTAL_TH, which represents the total amount 
invested within the first financing stage. Individual statistics are reported for each region (US versus Europe). The p-value is 
reported to test the significance of the difference in means between Europe and the US. For each variable the p-value is very small 
(less than zero), and thus the difference in means is significant. 
 
  
Europe 
 
US 
 
Difference 
Variable mean median mean Median p-value 
INVESTORS_ROUND1 1.51 1 2.11 2 0.00 
SYNDICATE_SIZE_ROUND_1 2.67 2 3.06 2 0.00 
NUM_ROUNDS 1.70 1 2.66 2 0.00 
DISCLOSED_ROUND_TOTAL_TH 16623.06 3137 12784.71 3000 0.00 
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Table 6 
Percentage of VC-Backed Companies by Region and Sector 
This table reports the percentage of VC-backed companies by region and sector. The percentage is calculated by taking the number 
of companies in Y region and X sector and dividing it by the number of companies in Y region. 
  
Biotech-
nology 
Communications and 
Media 
Computer 
Related 
Medical/Health/ Life 
Science 
Non-High 
Technology 
Semiconductors/ Other 
Elect 
              
EU 51.02 24.66 6.16 9.43 4.43 4.30 
EFTA 38.81 26.53 7.13 12.67 7.92 6.93 
EU + 
EFTA 50.56 24.73 6.19 9.56 4.57 4.40 
US 33.36 33.10 9.49 13.93 4.26 5.86 
Total 39.25 30.24 8.36 12.43 4.37 5.36 
 
Table 7 
Percentage of VC-Backed Companies within Respective Sector and Region That Have Gone Public 
This table shows the percentage of VC-backed companies that have gone public, conditional on the respective sector and region. 
Each percentage is calculated by taking the number of VC-backed companies that have gone public in X sector and Y region and 
dividing it by the overall number of VC-backed companies within X sector and Y region. 
 
Biotech-
nology 
Communications and 
Media 
Computer 
Related 
Medical/Health/ Life 
Science 
Non-High 
Technology 
Semiconductors/ Other 
Elect 
EU 4.81 5.30 9.72 6.59 8.70 6.96 
EFTA 7.65 9.70 5.56 6.25 15.00 14.29 
EU + 
EFTA 4.90 5.48 9.54 6.58 9.12 7.40 
US 9.94 6.43 12.59 8.15 17.58 10.30 
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Table 8 
Logit Regression Results 
This table shows results for the logistical (logit) regression model used: 
ܮ݋݃݅ݐ(݌) = 	 log൬ ݌1 − ݌൰ =	 ߙ + ߚଵܫܸܰܧܱܴܵܶܵ_ܴܱܷܰܦ1+ 	ߚଶܫܸܰܧܱܴܵܶܵ_ܴܱܷܰܦ1_ܴܵܳ + ߚଷܷܰܯ_ܴܱܷܰܦܵ+ ߚସܷܰܯ_ܴܱܷܰܦܵ_ܴܵܳ + 		ߚேܫܰܦܷܴܻܵܶ_ܦܷܯܯ ௒ܻ 		+ ߚோܻܧܣܴ_ܦܷܯܯ ோܻ 	+ ߝ௝ 
Note that there were also 20 year dummy variables that were included in the regression 
but not in this table. The regression is run for the European sample, as well as the US 
sample. 
 
  EUROPE USA 
EQUATION VARIABLES IPO_DUMMY IPO_DUMMY 
    
IPO_DUMMY INVESTORS_ROUND1 0.169** 0.212*** 
  (0.0769) (0.0319) 
 INVESTORS_ROUND1_SQR -0.00650 -0.00998*** 
  (0.00985) (0.00337) 
 NUM_ROUNDS 0.139** 0.124*** 
  (0.0566) (0.0268) 
 NUM_ROUNDS_SQ -0.00534 -0.0109*** 
  (0.00588) (0.00244) 
 CO_INDUSTRY_MAJOR_COMP 0.269*** -0.324*** 
  (0.102) (0.0625) 
 CO_INDUSTRY_MAJOR_LIFESCI 0.675*** 0.181** 
  (0.138) (0.0752) 
 CO_INDUSTRY_MAJOR_COMMS 0.412*** -0.171** 
  (0.133) (0.0752) 
 CO_INDUSTRY_MAJOR_BIOT 0.562*** 0.639*** 
  (0.162) (0.0943) 
 CO_INDUSTRY_MAJOR_SEMICON 0.486*** 0.124 
    
 CONSTANT -3.941*** -4.943*** 
  (0.198) (0.258) 
    
 OBSERVATIONS 13,207 25,370 
 PSEUDO R2 0.0683 0.0823 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 9 
Logit Regression Results 
This table shows results for the logistical (logit) regression model: 
ܮ݋݃݅ݐ(݌) = log൬ ݌1 − ݌൰ =	 ߙ + ߚଵܻܵܰܦ_ܴܰܦ1 + ߚଶܷܰܯ_ܴܱܷܰܦܵ	 + 
ߚଷܷܰܯ_ܴܱܷܰܦܵ_ܴܵܳ + 		ߚேܫܰܦܷܴܻܵܶ_ܦܷܯܯܻ_ܻ	 + 	ߚோܻܧܣܴ_ܦܷܯܯ ோܻ 	+ ߝ௝  
Note that there were also 20 year dummy variables that were included in the regression 
but not in this table. The regression was ran twice, one for the European sample, and one 
for the American sample. 
 
  Europe USA 
EQUATION VARIABLES IPO_DUMM
Y 
IPO_DUMMY 
    
IPO_DUMMY SYND_RND1 0.176** 0.343*** 
  (0.0829) (0.0470) 
 NUM_ROUNDS 0.148*** 0.135*** 
  (0.0563) (0.0268) 
 NUM_ROUNDS_SQ -0.00586 -0.0114*** 
  (0.00584) (0.00244) 
 CO_INDUSTRY_MAJOR_COMP 0.275*** -0.319*** 
  (0.102) (0.0625) 
 CO_INDUSTRY_MAJOR_LIFESCI 0.689*** 0.195*** 
  (0.138) (0.0751) 
 CO_INDUSTRY_MAJOR_COMMS 0.424*** -0.161** 
  (0.133) (0.0751) 
 CO_INDUSTRY_MAJOR_BIOT 0.597*** 0.664*** 
  (0.161) (0.0939) 
 CO_INDUSTRY_MAJOR_SEMICON 0.496*** 0.144 
  (0.173) (0.0964) 
 CONSTANT -3.767*** -4.782*** 
  (0.180) (0.256) 
    
 Observations 13,207 25,370 
 Pseudo R2 0.0668 0.0799 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
  41 
Table 10 
OLS Regression Results 
This table shows results for the OLS regression model: 
ܻܵܰܦ_ܴܰܦ1 = ߙ + ߚଵ ∙ ܦܫܵܥܮܱܵܧܦ_ܴܰܦ_ܱܶܶܣܮ_ܤ + ߚଶ
∙ ܥܱ_ܨܫܴܯ_ܰܣܶܫܱܰ_ܵܣܯܧ + 	ߚே ∙ ܫܰܦܷܴܻܵܶ_ܦܷܯܯܻ + ߚோ
∙ ܻܧܣܴ_ܦܷܯܯ ோܻ 
Estimates are determined for the entire sample as well as the European sample. Note that 
there were also 20 year dummy variables that were included in the regression but not in 
this table. 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES OLS ALL OLS Europe 
   
DISCLOSED_RND_TOTAL_B 0.000314*** 0.000637*** 
 (3.82E-05) (8.64E-05) 
CO_FIRM_NATION_SAME -0.172*** -0.0564*** 
 (0.00854) (0.0124) 
CO_INDUSTRY_MAJOR_COMP 0.151*** 0.120*** 
 (0.00729) (0.0149) 
CO_INDUSTRY_MAJOR_LIFESCI 0.159*** 0.141*** 
 (0.0108) (0.0253) 
CO_INDUSTRY_MAJOR_COMMS 0.146*** 0.145*** 
 (0.00927) (0.0200) 
CO_INDUSTRY_MAJOR_BIOT 0.199*** 0.266*** 
 (0.0143) (0.0286) 
CO_INDUSTRY_MAJOR_SEMICON 0.187*** 0.187*** 
 (0.0131) (0.0292) 
CONSTANT 0.350*** 0.305* 
 (0.0260) (0.161) 
   
OBSERVATIONS 28,730 6,565 
OBSERVATIONS . . 
R-SQUARED 0.052 0.055 
F 58.45 14.08 
CDF . . 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** P<0.01, ** P<0.05, * P<0.1 
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Table 11 
OLS and IV Regression Results 
This table shows results for the following model:  
ܫܱܲ_ܦܷܯܯܻ =
ߚଵ଴ + ߚଵଵܻܵܰܦ_ܴܰܦ1	+ ߚଵଶܫܸܰܧܱܴܵܶܵ_ܴܱܷܰܦ1_ܴܵܳ		 + ߚଵଷܷܰܯ_ܴܱܷܰܦܵ	 + ߚଵସܷܰܯ_ܴܱܷܰܦܵ_ܴܵܳ		 +
ߚଵହܱܶܶܣܮ_ܫܸܰܧܵܶܯܧܰܶ_ܤ + ߚଵ଺ܦܫܵܥܮܱܵܧܦ_ܴܱܷܰܦ_ܱܶܶܣܮ_ܯ + 		ߚଵேܫܰܦܷܴܻܵܶ_ܦܷܯܯ ௒ܻ 		+ 	ߚଵோܻܧܣܴ_ܦܷܯܯ ோܻ 	+
ݑଵ  
This table features 5 different regressions. First, OLS estimates were determined for each sample (All, Europe, US). After this, 
2SLS estimation was used for the entire sample and the European sample. This was not used to estimate the regression for the US 
sample as the IV was dropped for the US sample. The IV used is CO_FIRM_NATION_SAME and is instrumented on the 
SYND_RND1 variable. First-stage results are not shown. The simultaneous equation where SYND_RND1 is the left-hand side 
variable is: 
 
ܻܵܰܦோே஽ଵ = ߚଶ଴ + ߚଶଵܫܱܲ_ܦܷܯܯܻ + ߚଶଶܦܫܵܥܮܱܵܧܦ_ܴܱܷܰܦ_ܱܶܶܣܮ_ܯ	 + ߚଶଷ ∙ ܥܱ_ܨܫܴܯ_ܰܣܶܫܱܰ_ܵܣܯܧ	 + ߚଶே
∙ ܫܰܦܷܴܻܵܶ_ܦܷܯܯ ௒ܻ 		+ 	ߚଶோ ∙ ܻܧܣܴ_ܦܷܯܯ ோܻ 	+ ݑଶ 
 
Note that there were also 20 year dummy variables that were included in the regression but not in this table. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES OLS ALL IV ALL OLS EUROPE IV EUROPE OLS US 
      
SYND_RND1 0.0167*** 0.00641 0.00209 0.434*** 0.0231*** 
 (0.00338) (0.0315) (0.00632) (0.165) (0.00401) 
TOTALINVESTMENT_B 0.0755*** 0.0763*** -0.00735 -0.0305 0.271*** 
 (0.0204) (0.0205) (0.0213) (0.0292) (0.0394) 
DISCLOSED_RND_TOTAL_B 0.000225*** 0.000228*** 0.000292*** 4.13E-05 2.49E-05 
 (3.11E-05) (3.23E-05) (4.96E-05) (0.000116) (4.90E-05) 
NUM_ROUNDS 0.00883*** 0.00944*** 0.00310 -0.0379** 0.00709*** 
 (0.00193) (0.00268) (0.00511) (0.0170) (0.00220) 
NUM_ROUNDS_SQR -0.000760*** -0.000796*** 0.000601 0.00360*** -0.000735*** 
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Table 11 (continued) 
 (0.000171) (0.000202) (0.000586) (0.00138) (0.000186) 
CO_INDUSTRY_MAJOR_COMP -0.0125*** -0.0111* 0.0107 -0.0324* -0.0176*** 
 (0.00426) (0.00600) (0.00759) (0.0192) (0.00512) 
CO_INDUSTRY_MAJOR_LIFESCI 0.0320*** 0.0334*** 0.0681*** 0.0251 0.0237*** 
 (0.00628) (0.00755) (0.0129) (0.0236) (0.00722) 
CO_INDUSTRY_MAJOR_COMMS -0.00796 -0.00663 0.0148 -0.0374 -0.0148** 
 (0.00539) (0.00673) (0.0102) (0.0240) (0.00633) 
CO_INDUSTRY_MAJOR_BIOT 0.0745*** 0.0761*** 0.0658*** -0.0253 0.0753*** 
 (0.00830) (0.00964) (0.0148) (0.0398) (0.00987) 
CO_INDUSTRY_MAJOR_SEMICON 0.0174** 0.0191** 0.0324** -0.0285 0.0122 
 (0.00756) (0.00915) (0.0150) (0.0304) (0.00875) 
CONSTANT 0.164*** -0.00794 0.182** -0.0924** 0.229*** 
 (0.0139) (0.0156) (0.0818) (0.0404) (0.0168) 
      
OBSERVATIONS 28,713 . 6,559 6,559 22,154 
OBSERVATIONS . 28,713 . . . 
R-SQUARED 0.055 0.055 0.053 -0.623 0.058 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES OLS All IV All OLS Europe IV Europe OLS US 
      
F 55.47 54.64 12.29 7.394 45.29 
Cragg-Donald Wald F .  .  . 
Stock Yogo Weak ID test critical 
values 
. 52.141 . 9.747 . 
1% maximal IV size . 16.38 . 16.38 . 
15% maximal IV size . 8.96 . 8.96 . 
20% maximal IV size . 6.66 . 6.66 . 
25% maximal IV size . 5.53 . 5.53 . 
 
